For reviewers
For legal and expert reviewers
What a capture establishes, what it does not, and where the full reasoning is published.
Evidence that lets the other side’s expert see exactly what it establishes, and exactly what it doesn’t.
What a capture establishes
- What was sent. Our relay witnesses the traffic on its way to you without being able to read the encrypted content. Where a connection begins with a full handshake, the website’s own signature proves it was that site; resumed connections are reported separately.
- That nothing has changed since. Sealed with post-quantum and classical signatures.
- Built so anyone can check both. Without us, our servers or our cooperation.
What it does not establish
- Whether the content is true or genuine. We prove a website sent it, not that what it shows really happened.
- Who was at the keyboard. We prove what the site sent to your session, including which account it showed as the author, not who was operating that account.
- Anything before you captured it. Nobody can go back and witness a page that has already changed.
- That our relay is beyond question. We operate it: it is independent of whoever captured the evidence, not of us, and we set out exactly what that means.
The reasoning behind each of these is published in full in Shorenet Research.
We don’t prove something is real. We prove it was there.
Shorenet does not detect deepfakes, and we don’t claim to. Most of the time, that is not the question anyway. A defamatory post, a misleading advert, a scam website, a fake review, an intimate image shared without consent: what matters is that it was published, where, and exactly what it said.
In England and Wales, sharing an intimate image without consent is an offence whether the image is real or synthetic. A false advert misleads whether or not its photos are genuine. In cases like these, proving what was online is central to the case, and that is what Shorenet is built to prove. Consent, attribution and the other elements still need their own evidence.